Morality is as real and unreal as any other software.

This is a video of Richard Dawkins conducting a Q&A, mostly with students and faculty from Jerry Falwell's Liberty University.

The Christian interlocutors persistently repeated a slightly different question than Dawkins seemed to think they were asking. There are two questions about morality in their context: "First, does any such thing exist at all?" and second, "Once having settled that there exists a distinction between right and wrong, why do any humans abide by it?" Dawkins offered a persuasive explanation from evolution for the existence of a moral sense motivating us to be nice the same way lust motivates us to have sex.

What they really wanted to hear was whether "moral" and "immoral" are distinguishable; whether these are words with any measurable referent. I can show that they are. I've discussed this with Dr. Dawkins over internet relay chat with Universists, but I'm not sure he was sufficiently convinced to start offering it to audiences. In any case, it satisfies me.

In one sense, morality exists; in another sense, it doesn't. Morality exists in the same form that economics, linguistics, and chess exist. It is as real as they are, and also sort of unreal by the same standards by which money and language are partially unreal. These are all systems of rules that people invent, within which they can conduct transactions.

Rule sets are as real and unreal as any other software. Processors juggle electricity from circuit to circuit according to software rules, in a set of transactions. We can observe and measure them, so they're real, but when the electrons stop moving in the circuits, where did the calculation go? It was never "there." It was never any place in particular.

The English language was not floating out there in some metaphysical form, waiting to be discovered by the first English speaker. Neither was the rule set of chess. We can even invent alternatives to them. Neither does morality have independent existence. And yet I hardly think a theist will carry the argument through, and say we have no ability to tell, within broad limits, whether someone is measurably practicing "correct" English and "correct" F.I.D.E. chess.

"I can just carry on hurting people as much as I want" is like saying "I will speak my own language to myself that no one else knows, and play my own chess-like game against myself." Rule sets are not objectively real, and subjectively they can be whatever you want if you never make any interpersonal transactions with them; but _inter_subjectively they are as real as bedrock. You can carve bedrock, but you can't wish it away. Believe me, I have some experience with artificial languages, chess variants, and artificially-designed religions. You still have to know English, and you won't get many people to play any chess-like game other than Chess.

You can even say "I don't particularly like morality and I don't want to participate in that system", and still meaningfully tell more or less whether someone is doing it.

We have chess pieces, dollar bills, writing and sound waves as physical representations of rule sets. But that's all they do-- represent information systems the way the logic alphabet serves as cognitive ergonomics for formal logic. These are just prosthetic devices to help us measure, the way an abacus would help our primate brains perform arithmetic. I'm not sure there is any such equivalent physical device for moral reasoning, which could be where some of the confusion of godbotherers is coming from.

Yes, we can observe and measure morality without fleeing into irrationalism, the same way we can do so with economics. As with so many Christian philosophical "solutions", their solution utterly destroys what they were using it to support.

Take the argument from First Cause, which they also addressed to Professor Dawkins. The premise is that everything must have a cause. Therefore the universe must have a cause. Therefore that cause is God. But what caused God? An intelligence fully-formed at the beginning of the universe is, as Professor Dawkins so eloquently described, massively more implausible than even the weakest explanation of the Big Bang from physics. Infinite complexity can arise incrementally from simple rules through blind, purposeless evolution, but doesn't spring to life fully-formed. Our primate brains are only familiar with complicated things making simpler things, but that instinct of our primate brains is wrong.

If we are willing to make an exemption to causation, it's less ridiculous to say the universe itself is uncaused than God. At least we know the universe exists, and Occam's Razor says not to multiply entities unnecessarily. I wish Professor Dawkins had replied "Wait a minute. Either everything must have a cause, or not. You posited everything must have a cause, therefore, if that is so, God must." But that is precisely the kind of double standard used by religious apologists. They only find God more plausible as a first cause because matter and energy, time and space aren't the Alpha Monkey in the tribe, to whom our primate brain seeks to give up our responsibility for thinking.

So it is with their own reasons for declaring morality to be a meaningful, measurable distinction. It is; just not for their reasons. The problem is that the primate brain doesn't see right and wrong coming from the suffering of the victim, but coming from the Alpha Male Monkey. Just as in the First Cause argument, God results from an abdication of personal responsibility for reasoning. Right and wrong are whatever the Alpha Male Monkey say they are. The suffering of the victim doesn't matter to an obedience-based morality.

Just as doing all arithmetic with a calculator leaves one innumerate, looking up rules on a list doesn't practice moral reasoning and leaves one morally illiterate.

Comments

rachelann1977 on Nov. 14, 2006 3:17 AM

First, I love this argument that you made in your post: "I wish Professor Dawkins had replied 'Wait a minute. Either everything must have a cause, or not. You posited everything must have a cause, therefore, if that is so, God must.'" How simple and true!

Second, on listening to Dawkins answer the question about whether atheists need some sort of organization in order for apostasy to spread, repeating the idea that getting atheists together is like trying to herd cats. An important reminder, I think.

Hopefully, I will post on this soon.

metalfatigue on Nov. 14, 2006 3:33 AM

The interesting question, to me, is "What set of rules (if any) governs the evolution of arbitrarily complex but substantially similar moral systems in different human societies?" It would be like Chomsky's deep structure but for ethics instead of linguistics. For that matter, if both exist, they might well be related.

rachelann1977 on Nov. 14, 2006 4:17 AM

I think Dawkins answers this question fairly sufficiently when he posits that for human beings, the development of morality while living in small groups/societies was a survival advantage. Therefore, following Darwinian logic, those humans with the genetic structure to form brains that develop this sort of morality are more likely to survive and reproduce.

metalfatigue on Nov. 14, 2006 4:20 AM

…aaand Dawkins is not alone in answering the wrong question.

rachelann1977 on Nov. 14, 2006 4:25 AM

You must reword the question, then, because I believe it was answered adequately as worded.

metalfatigue on Nov. 14, 2006 5:13 AM

To say that there is an evolutionary advantage in something does not explain why it evolved the precise way that it did. There's an evolutionary advantage in language use; that doesn't tell us anything about the reasons for structural similarities in different, historically and geographically unrelated human languages. I raised the question of whether there is a deep structure to human moral systems beyond the simply pragmatic, analogous to Chomsky et al.'s hypothesized deep linguistic structure.

By the way, simply stating that a certain trait could have resulted in a competitive advantage in a situation which you consider to have been relevant in evolutionary time is not a proof; it's a just-so story.

matt-arnold on Nov. 14, 2006 5:46 AM

By the way, simply stating that a certain trait could have resulted in a competitive advantage in a situation which you consider to have been relevant in evolutionary time is not a proof; it's a just-so story.
You might wish to make it clear that you are asking the question of the scientific profession, not of commenters here, unless you expect commenters here to go into the laboratory and the field and accumulate proof to substantiate their suggestions. I'm afraid there's not much better that we can do here except reference professionals who have done so. That's what Rachel appears to have done.

metalfatigue on Nov. 14, 2006 6:39 PM

I'm sorry; I guess I didn't make that as clear as I'd intended.

In fact, I was pondering an avenue of research that I'd like to see someone (possibly me, if I ever get a Ph.D. in cognitive science) undertake. I was hoping for a meta-discussion, or else a pointer to research that had already been done on the subject.

rachelann1977 on Nov. 14, 2006 9:09 PM

Now THAT is an entirely different thing. I'm personally very interested in the neurology side of this.. I hope you didn't find me too rude. I get that way when I'm in debate mode. It's really not personal as I'm quite a kind person otherwise. If there were any money in it, though, I would've gone into philosophy in a heartbeat.

Instead, I'm in medical school. I wonder who I could possibly get interested enough in funding a brain study about morality? Definitely food for thought.

rachelann1977 on Nov. 14, 2006 1:09 PM

You asked for an explanation, not a proof. I gave you what could be considered a plausible explanation. There is no proof, of course, for that sort of thing yet, because we have not yet reached the stage in neurology where we understand thd completely that part of the brain involving morals.

"To say that there is an evolutionary advantage in something does not explain why it evolved the precise way that it did."
Actually, it does.

users on Nov. 15, 2006 1:12 AM

"To say that there is an evolutionary advantage in something does not explain why it evolved the precise way that it did."
Actually, it does.

No. It indicates why that trait was reinforced... but it doesn't explain why it evolved that way to begin with... however, that point seems relatively moot. I'm curious about the answer, but it wouldn't change anything of substance to know it...

rachelann1977 on Nov. 15, 2006 1:15 AM

Well, if you go with evolutionary theory on how the trait got there in the first place, it was a random mutation. The mutations are always random, it's the selection part that isn't.

users on Nov. 15, 2006 1:26 AM

So to go back to the originating point, how does something like morality (non-genetic) observe or not the evolutionary theory. Does it adhere precisely, making morality completely random until reinforced by society? If that is the case, why does morality have the strange slant that it does? Or is there some other selection process?

Interesting, if completely unnecessary, questions. :)

rachelann1977 on Nov. 15, 2006 2:15 AM

Actually, that is the key question, and what I neglected to ask in my most recent LJ, but should have. I know that the prefrontal cortex is very much involved in the ability to follow social norms. Social norms really are, effectively, the same thing as morality. Or rather, morality is the product of social norms. If our prefrontal cortex did not have the particular type of organization it has, whatever that may be, we may not ever have evolved a complex system of morals. But just how specifically can genetics control such a thing? That's really hard to tell. There is an argument for a non-genetic component, based purely on sociology, and the "passing down" of morality from one generation to the next, primarily via story telling. But then again, our ability to tell stories is also genetically encoded as a particular brain structure/organization, so I guess I'd have to say whatever the answer, it is complex and multifactorial, but ultimately not inexplicable.

users on Nov. 15, 2006 2:21 AM

"But just how specifically can genetics control such a thing? That's really hard to tell. There is an argument for a non-genetic component, based purely on sociology, and the "passing down" of morality from one generation to the next, primarily via story telling. But then again, our ability to tell stories is also genetically encoded as a particular brain structure/organization, so I guess I'd have to say whatever the answer, it is complex and multifactorial, but ultimately not inexplicable."

Yes! These are questions that I'm very much intrigued by. Not, mind you, intrigued enough to do any research or searching... but intrigued nonetheless. :) How much of what goes on in our minds relate to chemical/genetic/structural things, and how much is the "mind" (or whatever you want to call it). It's not inexplicable, it's ineffable, which is much more fun to say... in-F-able!

rachelann1977 on Nov. 15, 2006 2:29 AM

a good word indeed! I actually had to look it up to make sure I knew what it meant :-p

I can't resist answering this one. I've recently come to see the mind as a much less ephemeral thing than I used to think of it as. I now believe that what we call mind, and assume is separate from body, really is not at all separate from the body. Instead it is that wonderful amalgomation of chemical responses in the brain taken together, both long-term and short-term. All of the pathways that are unique to the individual, along with the broad strokes that we all require for life. We don't see all of the minute individual functions, we see it as a whole, and call it mind. Maybe in another 10 years, I'll see it differently again, but that's my current take.

matt-arnold on Nov. 15, 2006 4:06 AM

Moral reasoning is like arithmetic. Granted, our empathy and fairness are evolved instincts, but working out the relative rightness and wrongness of particular actions is a feature of reasoning. It's no different from figuring out how to build a building so that it won't fall down. You look at who owes what to whom, and who got what benefit from whom, whether they earned it, or what they reciprocated with.

Notice all those economic terms. Economics is probably the field most closely related to ethical philosophy. With money we make judgements of value. Those values are based on our desires-- our instinctual drives-- sure. Granted. But we can still weigh things against each other in each transaction. We can still count money with our higher brain and not rely on instinct.

In the same way, you figure out that stealing, for instance, is wrong because one side of the transaction is missing. We exchange reputation like currency, and blame is debt. We say an ex-con has "repaid his debt to society." One may as well ask why we "evolved to think that 2 + 2 equals 4" as to ask why we "evolved to think stealing is wrong". It's because when you take two dollars and another two dollars, they really are four dollars. Saying it's three really is bad math. Building a building in such a way that it falls down really is bad architecture. Stealing really is bad ethics. And so on.

rachelann1977 on Nov. 15, 2006 12:52 PM

In many cases, I totally agree with this, but it's still a fact that reasoning comes from the brain, and the way we reason has also evelved. Just because something is true doesn't mean we should know that it's true. As I said above, it's more than just one part of the brain, and it's a complex interaction of multiple factors.

rachelann1977 on Nov. 14, 2006 4:24 AM

I forgot to mention my thoughts regarding the girl who asked about anger being a common response to the "deconditioning process" from a parent's religion. I really think Dawkins should read up on psychology some if he's actually interested in this question. I think the stages of dealing with death and dying have been universally accepted in the psychological community to apply equally as well to any sort of major loss or highly significant change in one's life. While the loss of religious conditioning may not seem to be such a bad thing, it is a major loss, and also a major life change, nonetheless.

The stages are: Denial, Anger, Bargaining, Depression, Acceptance. Any of these may apply in any order, and they tend to fluctuate back and forth for most people. I think it is also important to note that the same process would apply for the parents of said budding atheist when and/or if the atheist in question "comes out."

I should not forget to credit the late and great Elizabeth Kubbler-Ross (sp?) for her work on death and dying, as she is the one who came up with these stages in the first place. She is also to credit for the founding of the hospice movement in America.

matt-arnold on Nov. 14, 2006 4:43 AM

Anger can come from betrayal. The very specific God as described in the Christian bible would carry little weight as an idea, were it not for growing up around only believers. Christian authority figures such as parents, pastors and teachers are betraying the trust placed in them. Imagine finding out as a teen that your entire social support structure-- teachers, pastors, even your own parents-- have been cogs in a giant lie-manufacturing machine. When I was growing up, I heard them spend hours every week begging and cajoling me to believe what they were saying. I think that request obligates them to excercise the tiniest bit of responsibility to be right about it. By faith, they don't. Young people need better guidance than that. It's a betrayal worthy of inducing anger.

rachelann1977 on Nov. 14, 2006 1:12 PM

I understand that completely, and do not mean to belittle it by saying it is a universal experience, and reaction to major change and/or loss. Does not a person feel betrayed when a loved one dies?

I would posit though, that the anger may be an initial reaction for some people, not attached to the physical world until they give it some attachment. Not for everyone, but for many, emotion comes before reason. It is a common human experience rooted in neurochemistry.

matt-arnold on Nov. 14, 2006 2:33 PM

I didn't feel betrayed when a loved one died. I can imagine how some instinct in our monkey brain would cause us to experience an inexplicable sense of betrayal in that circumstance. But an important distinction is that in the cases I described, the betrayal is real.

rachelann1977 on Nov. 14, 2006 2:35 PM

That is true, and the long-term reaction to that will, of course come more from the neocortex. :-D

users on Nov. 15, 2006 1:16 AM

"Imagine finding out as a teen that your entire social support structure-- teachers, pastors, even your own parents-- have been cogs in a giant lie-manufacturing machine."

Not to be pedantic (me, pedantic?), but I think that statement needlessly attributes malicious intent to simple incorrectness. If you had said "incorrectness-manufacturing machine" or "illogic-manufacturing machine", I could have gotten behind you. I prefer to believe that, in most cases, the parents, pastors, and teachers BELIEVE what they teach. That means they aren't lying, they're wrong, and there's a world of difference there. The amount of betrayal one can reasonably be expected to feel as a result of being lied to is far in excess of the amount one can be expected to feel merely by being misinformed.

matt-arnold on Nov. 15, 2006 3:50 AM

Anyone who really believes doesn't need faith.

The lies are mostly not "malicious", but the fact that they are lies they tell to themselves leaves them no less lies. It's long overdue for faith to be looked on as the practice of self-deception that it is. Remember, I'm talking about those who set themselves up as authority figures. They aren't just misinformed, they're in the business of disinformation.

users on Nov. 15, 2006 12:27 PM

I guess that makes the implicit assumption that they are, in fact, wrong. I don't believe Xtians are specifically right per se, but I don't think they are any more likely to be wrong than the Hindus, or the atheists, or anyone else for that matter. The important part is, they believe it.

Lets remember that, a lie is a statement that is known or assumed to be false... be it by overt statement, omission, or otherwise. The key is that they KNOW or ASSUME it to be false. If the genuinely believe it to be true, it is no longer a lie, it is incorrect information... but they are, to their perspective, in the business of providing valid and useful information.

By your definition, weathermen should be generate the same degree of betrayal... they are demonstrably incorrect as often as not... but they believe that they are telling the truth. They believe they are imparting wisdom that is useful.

Damn, I hate being an apologist for clergy. I don't find them useful in society... I just don't think it's reasonable to consider what they do lying.

rachelann1977 on Nov. 15, 2006 1:01 PM

A weathermn is a bad comparison, because they only claim what they are saying to be as close as possible to the truth based on scientific evidence. A better example would be an herbalist. They don't tend to use true science to back up their claims, although sometimes they are able to make it sound like science.

matt-arnold on Nov. 15, 2006 3:10 PM

Jer, are you seriously saying we don't know if there are virgin births, or people rising from the dead as proof that they are your benevolent dictator, or if dinosaur bones should really be labeled "4,000 years old"? Did you think we were just talking about shaky metaphysics like heaven or reincarnation? Religious teachers make preposterous claims about our physical world of science, and go on believing in the teeth of evidence, because they see faith as giving them a free pass. What's worse, they encourage those in their charge to do this.

Rachel's right. There's no comparison to weathermen. I wish preachers were like weathermen saying there's 10 percent chance of rain this weekend. "Ten percent chance of heaven if you say this prayer." Instead they claim 100% certainty.

If religious faith were like the trust we place in scientists, we would not be considered sinful for withdrawing our trust when we see that the evidence doesn't point that way after all. Like a dollar bill which is supposed to be redeemable for gold on demand, our trust that a scientific claim is true is supposed to be exchangeable for evidence on demand without being accused of a disloyal lack of faith.

"If a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company of men that call into question or discuss it, and regards as impious those questions which cannot easily be asked without disturbing it—the life of that man is one long sin against mankind." —W. K. Clifford

http://www.nemorathwald.com/How_to_Choose_Truth_Claims.htm

users on Nov. 16, 2006 12:13 PM

All of that is very compelling. It is also dramatically off of the topic this particular thread had taken on. The discussion herein what related to whether or not it is a "lie" to teach the religious belief that you genuinely believe in.

Logically, philosophically, and definitionally, it is simply not. It is no more so than the belief that the sun revolved around the earth was a lie... it was WRONG, but not a lie.

matt-arnold on Nov. 16, 2006 3:25 PM

I'd like to be just as sensitive as the next guy to not calling something a lie if it's just a mistake. I've seen that done plenty often enough in my day, and explained the distinction to many religious people who needed it. One of the favorite tactics of the religious is to claim that deep down, you really know they're right. I'm aware how obnoxious that practice is. I wouldn't like to accuse them of it. However, it becomes difficult not to point to their own words about how they form and maintain their beliefs. "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." "For we walk by faith and not..." by what? "... by sight." "Blessed are they who have not seen, and yet believe." Faith is biblically defined as hostility toward reality. Tell me how that's honesty.

I thought Abraham Lincoln put it pretty well when he said "It is an established maxim and moral that he who makes an assertion without knowing whether it is true or false is guilty of falsehood, and the accidental truth of the assertion does not justify or excuse him." Whether we call it "falsehood", or call it whatever, there is something morally untoward going on, and when those we trust practice it, it's time to be angry.

OK. Look at it this way. I'm sure you have had the experience of being convinced of something. Think of a proposition that looks overwhelmingly more likely than the alternatives to you. After that happened, how much did you need to have a weekly infomercial-style pep rally in which, if only you all shout "amen" loud enough and sing it over and over until you're practically in a self-hypnotic trance, you convince yourself that you truly believe it?

I'll bet you don't need to do that. If you have no beliefs in your life that require you to do that in order to go on thinking they're true, consider the possibility that you have never seen or experienced the phenomenon I am describing as lying. It's possible you've never looked back on decades of preaching and suddenly recognized their crowing and strutting as desperately trying to convince themselves they really, really mean it. Pushing one's sight of reality out of consciousness and brazenly admitting to everybody that you are doing so is not honest. So your point is that not all forms of a lack of honesty are "lying"? I'll revise my words, but it won't make much difference where the anger is concerned.

users on Nov. 16, 2006 3:54 PM

I think it is important to understand that I make no assertion that Christians are right. In fact, quite the opposite, their beliefs are in almost direct opposition to most of mine. The assertion I make regards intent; let us remember where this all began.

I find it hard to feel "betrayed" by someone who was wrong. Other people feel perfectly comfortable being angry and feeling betrayed merely for being misinformed. That's their thing... and I'm cool with that. I just don't have the time in my life to waste with such (seemingly) unfounded anger. I ahve found much better things to randomly anger myself over....

Science if full of "oops" moments and denials of reality. The Cosmological Constant was adhered to by some scientists with almost religious fervor for WAY too long. I don't get angry that we were wrong about science. I don't get angry when I think of all of the science that we currently believe but will ultimately be disproven years from now. I also don't get angry because some people teach that incorrect science today. People teach what they believe to be true... and I can't find anger or betrayal in myself for that..

I think the most telling thing is this:

Think of a proposition that looks overwhelmingly more likely than the alternatives to you. After that happened, how much did you need to have a weekly infomercial-style pep rally in which, if only you all shout "amen" loud enough and sing it over and over until you're practically in a self-hypnotic trance, you convince yourself that you truly believe it?

I read that to mean, because you dissaprove of their method of belief... because you feel that their way of believing can be characterized as an "infomercial-style pep rally".. it smacks of dishonesty. I disagree... it smacks of comfort. I try not to judge those that need such simple, obvious things as comfort anymore than I judge polytheistic societies that relied on mythology for their science in years gone by. Were they stupid? No, just ignorant.

It is plausible that my belief structure will one day be disproved. That one day, it will be PROVEN that there is no God. I don't believe it will be, because I believe that there is a God... but it is plausible. It is similarly plausible that my belief structure will one day be PROVEN, beyond a shadow of a doubt. Until that time... my assumption is that anyone who genuinely believes, regardless of how *YOU* characterize their belief, is not lying... they're just risking being wrong.

Is it pushing reality out of conciousness? Nope. It's viewing reality the way that makes sense to the individual. As we adopt new scientific theories, are those that are reluctant to give up their old, not-yet-demonstrably disproven theories liars? No, they are clinging to the beliefs that form their view of the world around them... just as theists cling to God and atheists cling to the lack of God... to change requres an amazing mental shift... I know, I once believed in a Christian God... then I became an atheist. I spent some 15 years of my life as an atheist... and a bitter one. Today, I have a relatively recently acquired non-Christian faith in God. It is a distinct shift in intellect, perspective, and thought process... and is therefore resisted...

At the end of the day, this is really a relatively pointless thread to follow. We aren't discussing the same thing. My concern is with the mischaracterization of the teachings of religious parents and clergy as "a statement made by someone who believes or suspects it to be false, in the expectation that the hearers may believe it" (because that is what a lie is)... your contention is that a fiction is a lie... which is simply, definitionally, untrue. A fiction, while it may be false, cannot be a lie unless it is A) known to be false and B) delivered with the intent to deceive. I don't think that your average believer qualifies... regardless of how "foolish" or "self-hypnotic" their method of worship might be.

There are many logically valid and rhetorically sound reasons to bash Christianity... this isn't one of them.

matt-arnold on Nov. 16, 2006 7:39 PM

I do know (and have been happily employed by) clergy who I like and who I believe to be honest and sincere, though delusional. I don't deny their existence.

I could prove to you with many examples of religious leaders I know who know what they are saying is false and deliver it with the intent to deceive. Apparently you have had the good fortune to avoid these charlatans. I haven't. You don't strike me as the sort who would deny the existence of snake-oil salesmen entirely.

I won't hold them guiltless. But I forgive you for doing so.

users on Nov. 17, 2006 12:32 AM

Okay, now I understand where our POVs diverged. I apologize for being dense earlier, I was clearly misunderstanding your point. No, I certainly haven't been nearly fortunate enough to avoid "snake-oil salesmen" at all... I was understanding you to be saying that *all* peddlers of faith were lying, not a specific subset of those that do not believe but continue to peddle their brand of hokum... I agree, the latter catagory is most certainly lying.

Again, my apologies for being dense.

temujin9 on Nov. 14, 2006 9:56 PM

intersubjectively

Thank you. I was looking for this word for a while, and just hadn't realized it. Describes the environment of memetic propigation perfectly . . .

Anonymous on (None)